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ABSTRACT
Japan is one of most innovative drug manufacturer-friendly
countries because it revised its patent and drug regulation systems
for providing patent and non-patent incentives for new use and
treatment R&D based on its pro-patent and pro-medical science
policies. This article provides an overview of the pharmaceutical
industry and examines patent and non-patent incentives for drug
R&D in focusing on incentives for developing new uses of and
treatments for known drugs from a comparative law perspective.
After discussing the difficulties in establishing infringement and in
obtaining injunctions against generic drug manufacturers who
infringe new use product patents, the article reviews measure
Japanese scholars have proposed to help secure incentives for new
use and treatment R&D and proposes an alternative solution.
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INTRODUCTION
Professor Benjamin Roin 1 argues that the current legal
infrastructure in the United States for patent and non-patent
incentives is designed to promote new drug development and that,
without a mechanism to enforce new use patents, it creates a large
gap among the incentives for pharmaceutical innovations. Data
protection for a new use of a previously approved drug is limited to
three years, which is substantially less than the five years provided
for new drugs that contain new chemical entities.2 Because of the
inherency doctrine, in the United States, pharmaceutical firms can
only obtain a method patent for a new use of an existing drug. New
use method patents are difficult to enforce because patients directly
infringe the patents by taking a known drug for a patented use. Drug
manufacturers are only secondarily liable for active inducement.
Medical practitioners who might be liable for active inducement are
1

Professor Benjamin Roin is one of our esteemed panelists in the Future of
Innovation in Medicine Symposium. For his argument, Benjamin Roin,
Solving the Problem of New Uses, Draft of October 14, 2016
(https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/Solving-the-Problem-of-New-UsesBen-n.-Roin.pdf)
2
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). See also 21 C.F.R. §
314.108 (2016).
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exempted from patent infringement liability under the U.S. Patent
Act. 3 Moreover, because of active ingredient limitations, U.S.
patentees cannot take advantage of patent term extension (P.T.E.)
provisions.4
Japan provides more incentives for new use Research &
Development through both patent and non-patent protection. The
Law on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Products including
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices (L.P.M.D.) provides up to six
years of data protection for a new use of a previously approved
drug.5 The Japanese Patent Law (J.P.L.) allows product patents on
new uses to facilitate enforcement against drug manufacturers,
patent term extensions on new uses, and dosage regimes for existing
drugs. The Japanese government has adopted pro-patent and promedical science policies. Despite the exclusive rights afforded new
uses of drug products, the government is concerned about
insufficient incentives for medical science innovations. This
concern results from excluding medical methods from patentability
due to a lack of industrial applicability under the JPL even if medical
methods are protected indirectly through a patent on a drug product
being limited by its use. 6 The Japanese government organized a
committee to examine the impact of the exclusion and innovative
measures to secure incentives for new uses and dosage regimens of
known drugs.
This article provides an overview of the pharmaceutical
industry, in light of the Japanese government’s patent and science
policy changes. It examines patent and non-patent incentives for
drug R&D and focuses on incentives for developing new uses of and
treatments for known drugs from a comparative law perspective.
Finally, this article discusses the difficulties in establishing
infringement and in obtaining injunctions against generic drug
3

35 U.S.C. § 287(c). See also Timothy J. Lithgow, Patent Infringement
Immunity for Medical Practitioners and Related Health Care Entities, 37
Jurimetrics 251 (1997).
4
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1).
5
Iryohin, Iryokiki no Hinshitsu, Yukousei oyobi Anzensei no Kakuhonado ni
Kan’suru Hōrtsu [The Law on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of
Products including Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices], Law No. 84 of
2013, Art. 14.4 [hereinafter “L.P.M.D.”].
6
Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Law No.121 of 1959, art. 29. For a discussion on the
exclusion of medical methods under JPL, see infra note 50.
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manufacturers who infringe new use product patents. Furthermore,
it reviews measures Japanese scholars have proposed to help secure
incentives for new use and treatment R&D.
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN
The Japanese pharmaceutical market is the second largest in the
world.7 However, industry analysts think that the role that Japanese
firms play in the global pharmaceutical market is limited, compared
with the roles that Japanese firms play in the electronics and
automobile industries. 8 In the 1950s and 1960s, the government
capital control policy protected Japanese drug manufacturers from
competition from foreign drug manufacturers.9 The capital control
policy, combined with tariffs and product standards, effectively
prevented the entry of foreign firms into the Japanese market.
Pharmaceutical products were excluded from patent eligible subject
matter until the J.P.L. was revised in 1976.10 Before the revision,
only a method of manufacturing and using a pharmaceutical product
was patent eligible. Due to this gap in patent protection, Japanese
drug manufacturers could make and sell drugs developed in foreign
countries at a relatively low cost.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese drug manufacturers began to
invest in new drug R&D as the government began to remove nontariff barriers via deregulation and open the Japanese market.11 In
7

Accessing the Japanese Generic Pharmaceutical Market, THOMSON REUTERS
(2014),
http://thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/pharmalife-sciences/case-study/newport-case-study-japanese-generics.pdf.
8
In rankings based on sales in 2014, Takeda is ranked 16 th globally and the
highest among Japanese firms. Waseem Noor, Pharma Exec’s Pharma 50
2014, PHARMEXEC (June 9, 2014), http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexecs-pharma-50-2014.
9
Shinji Takagi, Japan’s Restrictive System of Trade and Payments: Operation,
Effectiveness, and Liberalization, 1950-1964, (International Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 97/111, 1997),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97111.pdf.
10
See Tokkyohotō no Ichibu wo Kaiseisuru Horitsu [Law for Revising Patent
Law and Other Acts], Law No. 46 of 1975.
11
Maki Umemura, Globalisation and Change in the Japanese Pharmaceutical
Industry, 1990-2010, in COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION:
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1987, the J.P.L. was revised to introduce a P.T.E. system that
recoups the patent term. During this time, innovative drug
manufacturers cannot market their patented drugs due to delays in
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (M.H.L.W.)’s drug safety
examinations. 12 With the increased investment and additional
patent protection, Japanese drug manufacturers began to develop
new drugs in the 1990s. The Japanese government adopted a promedical science and patent policy, which enhanced this trend.13 In
2003, the Basic IP Law was enacted to create the IP Strategy
Headquarters in the Cabinet, which began to publish annual strategy
programs that charged ministries and agencies, particularly the
M.E.T.I. (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and the J.P.O.
(Japan Patent Office), with implementing action plans to enhance
patent protection.14
In 2006, Professor Shinya Yamanaka, an adult stem cell
researcher, and his research team successfully generated induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells). His research began to attract the
attention of the Japanese community, who eagerly awaited news of
Professor Yamanaka’s Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine.15
In 2008, the IP Headquarters tasked the M.E.T.I. and the J.P.O. to
review the J.P.L. in order to enable Japanese life science industries
to commercialize Professor Yamanaka’s research in regenerative
medicine and other types of translational research in medical
science.16
BRITISH AND JAPANESE ENTERPRISE 204 (M. Umemura and R. Fujioka eds.,
2012).
12
For more discussions on the PTE system, see infra note 39.
13
For a general discussion of the Japanese government’s pro-patent policy, see
Toshiko Takenaka, Success or Failure? Japan’s National Strategy on
Intellectual Property and Evolution of Its Impact from the Comparative
Law Perspective, 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 379 (2009).
14
Chitekizaisan Kihonhō [Intellectual Property Basic Act], Law No. 122 of
2002.
15
The Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, The Novel Prize in Physiology
or Medicine 2012 (Oct. 8, 2012).
16
See Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, Intellectual Property
Strategic Program 2008, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY
HEADQUARTERS (2008),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/keikaku2008_e.pdf. For the function
of Headquarters in IP law and policy making in Japan, see Toshiko
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Currently, due to its streamlined reimbursement mechanism
under the national health insurance system Japan is an attractive
market for drug manufacturers. In Japan, after an innovative drug
patent expires, the generic drug market share was significantly less
than in the U.S. market but has significantly increased with the
incentive through reimbursement of the national insurance system.17
Japanese drug manufacturers are highly ranked by the sales in
Japanese market,18 but a significant portion of Japanese drugs are
made and imported from European countries. 19 U.S. also lagged
behind on the trade balance because drugs are made in countries
where corporate tax is low.20 Furthermore, the global market sales
and new drug development of Japanese drug manufacturers exhibit
Takenaka & Ichiro Nakayama, Will Intellectual Property Policy Save Japan
from Recession? Japan’s Basic Intellectual Property Law and Its
Implementation through the Strategic Program, 35 IIC 877 (2004)
[hereinafter, Takenaka, IP Policy].
17
According to the statistics available from IMS Health, MIDAS, Market
Segmentation, the market share of generic drugs in the United States was
more than 90% in contrast to less than 40% in Japan in 2010. Iyakuhin
Sangyō Bijon 2013 Shiryō [Vision of Medical Product Industry: 2013Materials], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (2013) [hereinafter,
2013 Vision Material],
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/seisakunitsuite/bunya/kenkou_iryou/iryou/shinkou/
dl/vision_2013b.pdf. The share was increased to 56.2 percent as of
September 2015. Kōhatsu Iyakuhin no Shiyou Sokushin nitutite [Regarding
Promotion of Generic Drug Use], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR &
WELFARE (2013),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/kenkou_iryou/iryou/kouha
tu-iyaku/) [hereinafter, Generic Drug Share Promotion].
18
2013 Iyakuhin Kigyo Uriage Ranking [2013 Drug Manufacturers’ Ranking by
the sales], MEDISEARCH (2013),
http://www.medisearch.co.jp/doukou_kakukaihatuhi.html
19
New Vision for the Pharmaceutical Industry-Aiming at the Industry with
International Competitive Power taking the Mission of Innovation,
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter
MHWL 2007 New Vision Report],
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/iryou/shinkou/dl/01_0001.pdf.
20
Iyakuhin Sangyō Kyōka Sōgōsen’ryaku Sankō Shiryō [Strategies for
Pharmaceutical Product Industry Promotion, Reference Materials],
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2007),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10807000-IseikyokuKeizaika/0000096429.pdf.
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a significant lag compared to U.S. and European drug
manufacturers; only 16 percent of new active ingredients granted
market authorization in the Japanese market between 2008 and 2011
were developed by Japanese drug manufacturers.21
In 2014, the government promulgated the Law to Promote
Healthcare and Medical Strategy to establish the Office of
Healthcare and Medical Strategy Promotion in its Cabinet, which
should promote R&D in the healthcare and medical industry.22 This
new law should overhaul Japan’s drug industry and healthcare
system through deregulation, and it provides more opportunities for
foreign drug manufacturers in the Japanese market by easing
regulatory guidelines.23 Currently, Japan’s national strategy focuses
on medical science innovations, as well as on promoting health and
active aging.24 This strategy benefits innovative drug manufacturers
because it provides government funds for R&D in medical science.
It also benefits generic drug manufacturers by adopting various
measures to promote generic drug penetration through
implementing the MHLW’s 2013 roadmap, 25 wherein the
Healthcare Office set a target of cutting five trillion yen from
healthcare expenditures by 2025.26
See 2013 Vision Material, supra note 17 at Shiryō 20.
Kenkō Iryō Senryaku Suishinhō [Law to Promote Healthcare and Medical
Strategy], Law No. 48 of 2014.
23
Ames Gross, Japan’s Growth Strategy Promotes Medical and Healthcare
Reform, MEDTECH INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.medicaldevicesummit.com/RegulatoryCompliance/Features1/Ja
pans-Growth-Strategy-Promotes-Medical-and-Health-2086.aspx.
24
Japan Revitalization Strategy Revised in 2014, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN
AND H IS CABINET (June 24, 2014),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf.
25
Kōhatsu Iyakuhin no Saranaru Shiyosokushin notameno R ōdomappu nituite
[Regarding Roadmap for Further Promotion of Generic Drugs], MINISTRY
OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (April 5, 2013),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000002z7fr.html.
26
“Kokumin no Kenkōjumyō wo Enshinsuru Shakai” ni Muketa Yobō-Kenkō
Kanri ni Kakawaru Torikumino Suishin ni Tusuite [Promotion for Measures
of Preventive Medicine and Health Management toward “Society for
Japanese Citizens to Prolong Their Active Age”], MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/0000019326.html. The government also
aims to increase genetic drug market share to more than 80% by 2018. See
21
22
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II. NON-PATENT INCENTIVES
A. Relationship to Patent Incentives
Government agencies heavily regulate drug marketing and
production. In Japan, the M.H.L.W. and Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Device Agency (P.M.D.A.) regulate drug marketing under
the P.M.D.27 The level of drug development necessary to file a new
drug market authorization involves high risk and intensive
investment in R&D; the new drug approval success rate is 0.006
percent, and the average development cost is 50 billion yen. 28
Funding for innovative drug manufacturers heavily relies on
revenue from marketing exclusivity over a newly approved drug.
Both patent and data protection provide marketing exclusivity; these
protections prevent generic drug manufacturers from accessing
clinical data developed by the innovative drug manufacturers, which
is necessary for market approval of generic drugs.
Notably, innovative drug manufacturers cannot likely take
advantage of the full patent term because patent applications are
filed as soon as the active ingredient’s utility is established, and the
patent term expires twenty years from the filing date. 29
Furthermore, drug manufacturers may require three to ten years to
complete clinical trials and develop the data necessary to file a new
drug application, which is a substantially longer process than the
patent prosecution process at the J.P.O.30 Moreover, the P.M.D.A.

supra note 17, Generic Drug Share Promotion.
PMDA was established to conduct scientific reviews of drug and medical
devicemarket approvals in 2004 as an independent administrative agency
under Dokuritsu Hōjin Iryōhin Iryōkiki Sōgōkikōhō [Independent
Administrative Agency Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency Law]
Law No. 192 of 2002).
28
MHRL 2007 New Vision Report, supra note 19, at 28.
29
Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, art. 67.
30
The average period between filing a request for examination and the first
office action is less than a year. Tokkyo Gyōsei Nen’ji Hokokusho 2014
[Patent Administration Annual Report 2014], JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (2014),
https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/nenji/nenpou2014_xls.htm. A
request for examination must be filed within three years from the filing
date. See Japanese Patent Law Art. 43-3(1).
27
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may require an additional year to review applications.31 A P.T.E.
system is necessary for innovative drug manufacturers to recoup this
pre-approval patent term, during which manufacturers cannot
market their patented drugs. Furthermore, because generic drug
manufacturers can rely on the expensive clinical data developed by
innovative drug manufacturers, which reduces the necessary time
and cost for full safety and efficacy studies, they are prevented from
using the clinical data for various time periods, depending on the
type of drug. As a result, patent protection and data protection are
intertwined with the regulatory approval process.
B. The Regulatory Approval Process and Data Protection
In Japan, the regulatory approval process begins by filing a new
drug market approval application with the P.M.D.A. The
application must include clinical data necessary for the P.M.D.A. to
establish the new drug’s efficacy and safety. The cost of developing
the necessary data is not only expensive, but also involves high risk,
because the new drug must be tested on human subjects to establish
efficacy/effect and safety. The M.H.L.W. only issues a disposition
of market approval when the P.M.D.A. finds that all standards are
met.32
A disposition, a document issued for a market approval,
identifies a drug through its active ingredients, efficacy quantities,
dosage form, routes of administration, additional details on its
manufacturing process, and effective period. When a drug
manufacturer intends to sell a product that differs in its details from
the previously approved disposition, it must file another application
that includes the partial variations from the prior disposition. In
short, a drug manufacturer is only authorized to market the drug
identified by the dispositions. Thus, a new application is necessary
to market a previously approved drug if it is used for a new use or
31

See Toshiki Sugita, Recent Trends and Special Topics in New Drug Review in
PMDA, 2 Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal 99 (2013).
32
For the new drug application review procedures at the PDMP, see
Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, JAPAN
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (JPMA) (2015)
[hereinafter “Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan”],
http://www.jpma.or.jp/english/parj/pdf/2015.pdf.
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treatment.
As discussed above, regardless of patent protection, the United
States and some other countries, including Japan, provide an
additional market exclusivity term by preventing generic drug
manufacturers from accessing clinical trial data developed by new
drug manufacturers. In Japan, the post marketing surveillance
(P.M.S.) period system provides such additional protection. This
protection is available not only for a new drug, but also for a new
use of a previously approved drug.
To sell generic versions of previously approved drugs, generic
drug manufacturers must also file an application with the P.M.D.A.
for market approval. A generic drug features the same active
ingredients, efficacy/effect, quantities, and dosage as a previously
approved drug. 33 Thus, generic drug manufacturers can skip the
expensive efficacy and safety clinical trials because they can rely on
the data developed by the innovative drug manufacturer for the
previous approval. Generic drug manufacturers must only establish
stability and bioequivalence between the generic drug and approved
drug . 34 The period needed to develop such data is two to three
years, which is much shorter than is needed for new drug approvals.
However, generic drug manufacturers cannot receive market
approval until the P.M.S. period ends, even if the P.M.D.A. finds
that all the standards are met.35
The P.M.S. was introduced in 1979 and is aimed at ensuring
drug efficacy and safety after the drugs are sold. 36 Although
provision of additional protection to innovative drug manufacturers
33

Jenerikku Iyakuhin heno Gimon ni Kotaemasu [Answering Questions about
Generic Drugs], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (July 2012),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/iryou/kouhatu-iyaku/dl/02_120713.pdf.
34
Iyakuhintō no Tokkyoken no Sonzokukikan no Enchō Tōroku Seido oyobi Sono
Unyō no Arikata [The Best Practice for Patent Term Extension regarding
Drug and other Products], INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb.,
2015) [hereinafter, IIP, Best Practice],
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/chousa/pdf/zaisanken/2014_09.pdf.
35
Yukiko Ozaki, Abstract of Dissertation: Iyakuhin Sangō Shijō niokeru Shijō
Dokusenken ni kansuru Kosatsu [Study of Market Exclusivity in the Drug
Product Market], INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE STRATEGY HITOTSUBASHI
UNIVERSITY (Mar., 2010) [hereinafter “Study of Market Exclusivity”],
http://www.ics.hit-u.ac.jp/jp/phd/article_ozaki.pdf.
36
Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, supra note 32, at 73.
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was not the original aim, the P.M.S. provisions function in the same
manner as data protection under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 37 The
original P.M.S. period was only two years, but has since been
extended, as intellectual property protection has strengthened with
adoption of the IP-based national strategy. 38 Under the current
rules, the P.M.S. period varies depending on the type of approved
new drug: (1) four to six years for previously approved drugs with a
new use or dosage; (2) six years for new prescription drugs and
drugs with new routes of administration; (3) eight years for drugs
that include new active ingredients; and (4) ten years for orphan
drugs.39 As a result, drug manufacturers who developed a new use
for a previously approved drug enjoy revenue from an exclusive
market for a maximum of six years from the date of the drug’s
approval. This period of data protection is independent of patent
protection.40
In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a unique
framework that prevents generic drug manufacturers from
infringing patents held by innovative drug manufacturers, while
encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge such patents.41
Under this framework, filing a U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) marketing application with a certification stating that the
unexpired patent is invalid or unenforceable, constitutes patent
infringement. The patentee can file a patent infringement suit
against the generic drug manufacturer that filed the application.42
Generic drug manufacturers receive marketing exclusivity for 180
37

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Public Law
98-417 [hereinafter, “Hatch-Waxman Act”]. For further information on the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s history and goal, see Margo A. Bagley, Patent Term
Restoration and Non‐Patent Exclusivity in the United States (Aug. 1 2011)
(Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-25)
[hereinafter “Patent Term Restoration”], http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899533.
38
Study of Market Exclusivity, supra note 35, at 5. For a discussion of IP based
national strategies, see supra note 16, Takenaka, IP Policy.
39
Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, supra note 32, at 82.
40
Drug Re-Examination/Data Exclusivity in Japan and Neighboring Countries,
AIPPI Forum & ExCo Workshop, JPMA (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.aippi.org/download/helsinki13/presentations/Pres_Pharma_4_
Yokumura_300813.pdf.
41
Patent Term Restoration; supra note 37, at 5.
42
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)-(iv).
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days if they win the patent litigation.43
Neither the P.M.D. nor the J.P.L. provides such a dispute
resolution framework that links patent protection and the regulatory
approval process. In practice, under its administrative purview, the
P.M.D.A. requires generic drug manufacturers to provide patent
information related to the approved drug when they file a market
approval petition.44 If the P.M.D.A. finds a potential patent dispute,
it contacts the patentee/innovative drug manufacturer and requests
the patent information. The P.M.D.A. refuses to authorize market
approval if the patent is directed to the active ingredient of the
generic drug. The P.M.D.A used to authorize market approval if the
patent was not directed to the active ingredient but only to a use of
the generic drug. This practice was changed in 2009 when the
P.M.D.A. adopted a skinny label practice. Under this practice, if a
patent is directed to a use or dosage but not the active ingredient of
the generic drug, a disposition is issued for the generic drug,
excluding the patented use or dosage. 45 Thus, generic drug
manufacturers are unable to sell drugs indicating the patented use or
dosage.

43

See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Guidance for
Industry 180 Generic Drug Exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA (June
1998), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.
44
IIP, Best Practice, supra note 34, at 33. The administrative guidance, Gyōsei
Shidō, is a Japanese government practice under the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1993 in which an administrative agency provides to a
party guidance, recommendation, advice, and other acts that may be sought
to implement the administrative aim.
45
Tsutatsu [Notice] No. 065001, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE
(June 5, 2009), https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/entyouwg05_shiryou/sankou_2.pdf#search='%E8%96%AC%E9%A3%9F%E5%
AF%A9%E6%9F%BB%E7%99%BA%E7%AC%AC0605014%E5%8F%B
7. See also, Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan,
supra note 32 at 16. For a discussion of the skinny label practice under
U.S. Patent Act, see Herman H. Yue & John D. Garretson, Skinny Labeling
after Hospira v. Burwell: An End-Run Around Pharmaceutical Method of
Use, FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE (July/August 2015),
http://fdaimports.com/docs/solving_or_compounding_the_problem.pdf.
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III. PATENT INCENTIVES
A. Patentability of New Uses for Known Products
Under the J.P.L., a known product may meet the novelty and
inventive step requirements if: (1) the product features an inherent
function or property and (2) is limited to a use based on the function
or property, so long as the inherent use is unknown and
unpredictable to one skilled in the art of the invention, at the time
the patent application is filed. 46 The J.P.O. applies a special rule to
products in unpredictable arts, such as chemical compounds, to
determine novelty and inventive step. Even if the J.P.O. examiners
find that a product described in a claim under examination is
expressly or implicitly disclosed in a reference, the unpredictable art
special rule prevents the examiners from citing the reference, unless
the reference meets the enablement requirement for the disclosed
subject matter. 47 Courts require the J.P.O applying a high
enablement standard for citing a reference in unpredictable arts. A
reference must include sufficient information, such that one skilled
in the art of the invention will “readily” understand how to make
and use the disclosed subject matter in light of the technical common
knowledge at the time of patent application.48 Therefore, a claim
directed to a product in the unpredictable arts meets the novelty
requirement, even if detailed structures of the product are disclosed
in a reference, so long as no use or manufacturing process for the
product is known to one skilled in the art at the time the patent
application is filed. 49 Examiners can cite such reference in
combination with another reference for failing to meet the inventive
step to show that a use or manufacturing process for the product is
46

Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, art. 29(1)-(2).
Tokkyo Jitsuyo Shin’an Shin’sa Kijun [Exam Guidelines for Patent and Utility
Model in Japan], JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (Sept. 2015) (see Part III, Chapter
2, 3.1.1(1)b) [hereinafter JPO Examination Guidelines],
https://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/1312-002_e.htm. See also
Shimako Kato, Kagakubun’ya niokeru Shinposei no Kangaekata
[Examination of Inventive Step on Inventions in the Chemical Field], JAPAN
PATENT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION (2008) (see 61 Patento (No. 10) 86).
48
Tokyo Kotō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] October 16, 1986, Sho 59 (Gyo
ke) no. 303.
49
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 47, at Part III, 3.1.1.(1)b
47
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obvious to one skilled in the art of the invention.
This special rule is particularly relevant in determining the
novelty and inventive step for patent protection of medicinal
inventions because materials such as chemical compounds in
medicinal inventions are in the unpredictable art. The rule applies
to claims directed to a new medical use of a known chemical
compound based on discovering a property of the compound. The
J.P.O. established an examination practice to deny patentability to
method claims directed to use of a drug product for medical
treatment, based on a lack of industrial applicability.50 Instead, such
use is patentable as a product used for treatment because a product
patent can be enforced against drug manufacturers.51 The J.P.O. has
published special guidelines on medical inventions.
The
introduction to the J.P.O.’s Medicinal Invention Guidelines defines
‘material’ as a “a component used as an active ingredient, including
a compound, a cell, a tissue and a chemical substance (or a group of
chemical substances) whose chemical structure is not specified,
such as an extract from a natural product, and a combination thereof
[hereunder, an ‘active ingredient component’].” 52 Under the
Medicinal Invention Guidelines, J.P.O. examiners cannot cite a
reference to reject a claim directed to an active ingredient
component limited by a particular use, unless the reference includes
sufficient information that one skilled in the art could understand
not only the particular use for the component, but also a process for
making the component.53 An examiner can only cite a reference that
fails to disclose the particular use limited to the active ingredient
50

Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] April 11, 2002, Hei 12 (gyo ke) 65.
Hanrei Jihō No. 1828, 88. For a general discussion on patentability of
medical method under the JPL, see Yusuke Sato, Patent Protection of
Medical Methods—Focusing on Ethical Issues—From Current Situation
and Problems on Intellectual Property Law, Annual of Industrial Property
law, June 2007, 20 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y J. 125, 129 (Jiameng Kathy Liu
trans., 2011).
51
Shoichi Okumura, JAPAN PATENT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, BIO-SCIENCE
COMMITTEE TŌSHINSHO (Feb. 10, 2012) (see page 8) [Hereinafter,
“Okumura Bio-Science Committee”], http://jpaa.or.jp/seisaku/pdf/F111.pdf.
52
Tokkyo Jitsuyoushinhan Handobukku [Examination Handbook for Patent
Utility Model], Japan Patent Office (Annex B, Chapter 3),
https://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/7_3.pdf
53
Id. at 2.2.2 (2).
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component for an inventive step-based claim rejection. However,
examiners must cite another reference to show that the particular use
of a claimed product is predictable or obvious to one skilled in the
art.
The J.P.O.’s special unpredictable art rule significantly differs
from the inherency doctrine under U.S. case law. Under the
inherency doctrine, U.S.P.T.O. examiners can cite a reference
disclosing a product to reject a claim directed to a product in the
unpredictable art for a novelty (anticipation) rejection, even if the
reference does not disclose a property or function as long as the
property and function are necessarily present in the disclosed.54 The
J.P.O.’s inherency doctrine also significantly differs from the U.S.
inherency doctrine because the U.S. doctrine does not require that a
reference disclose sufficient information for one skilled in the art to
recognize the presence of a natural result, as long as the reference
meets the enablement requirement for the process.55 Discovery of a
new use or purpose for a product cannot prevent an anticipation
rejection, as long as the product is structurally identical to an old
product, and, thus, applicants cannot rely on an inherent claim
feature to distinguish a product in the prior art at the U.S.P.T.O.56
This case law eliminates patents for known products, whether or not
an application discloses a new and nonobvious use, based on
discovery of an inherent function and property. As a result, only a
method patent is available for a new use of a known product as long
as the use is new and nonobvious.

54

For a general discussion on the inherency doctrine, see, i.e., Janice M. Mueller
& Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation
Doctrine, 45 Hous L. Rev. 1101 (2008); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371 (2005); Bradford J. Duft & Eric P.
Mirabel, Principles of Inherency, 77 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 539
(1995). For a general discussion of the product of nature doctrine, see John
M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the
Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I),
85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 301 (2003).
55
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
56
Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11 (1892).
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B. Patent Term Extension
Under the J.P.L., owners of new use patents can request a patent
term extension to recoup the patent protection period lost while
waiting for market approval.57 The objective of Japan’s patent term
extension (P.T.E.) system is set forth under the J.P.L. as follows:
Where there is a period during which the patented invention
is unable to be worked because approvals prescribed by
relevant Laws that are intended to ensure the safety, etc. or
any other disposition designated by Cabinet Order as
requiring considerable time for the proper execution of the
disposition in light of the purpose, procedures, etc., of such
a disposition are necessary to obtain for the working of the
patented invention, the duration of the patent right may be
extended, upon the filing of a request for the registration of
extension of the duration, by a period not exceeding five
years.58
To request an extension, innovative drug manufacturers
must file a P.T.E. application and may receive a patent rights
extension that does not exceed five years if the application does not
fall into one of grounds for rejecting a request for patent term
extension. 59 One of such grounds is “where the disposition
designated by Cabinet Order is deemed unnecessary for working of
the patented invention which is under the examination for P.T.E.”60
The J.P.L.’s P.T.E. provision did not clarify the definition for
“working” the patented invention in connection with the
“disposition”. However, the scope of the drug is limited by the
claims, which differs from market approval of a drug, which is
limited by the disposition description.
The “unnecessary disposition” ground for rejection led to
considerable uncertainty in the scope of the market approval
disposition for P.T.E.s. The J.P.O. has a long-established
examination practice of granting patent extensions for new uses of
57

Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, Art. 67 (2) [hereinafter JPL].
JPL, Art. 67(2).
59
JPL, Art. 67(2), 67-2.
60
JPL, Art. 67-2(1)(i).
58
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known drug patents. However, it interpreted the grounds for
rejection in a manner that that denies P.T.E. applications for patents
directed to a new dosage and administration of a known drug for a
known use. Innovative drug manufacturers have challenged the
J.P.O.’s interpretation. In Genentech v. the JPO, the Intellectual
Property High Court of Japan (IP High Court) sided with the
patentee and struck down the J.P.O.’s interpretation by reversing the
J.P.O.’s rejection of Genentech’s P.T.E. application.61 Instead, the
IP High Court adopted an interpretation that entitles drug
manufacturers to a patent term extension—even if the ingredients,
use, and efficacy/effect are identical—as long as the quantity and
dosage differ. This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Japan.62
As a result, patent owners are given P.T.E. incentives with
an opportunity to recoup the portion of the patent term sacrificed for
market approval due to changes in the ingredients, use,
efficacy/effect, quantity and dosage from the previous approval.
However, the scope of exclusivity for an extended patent may be
narrower than the scope defined by the claim. In dicta, the IP High
Court stated in Genentech that a patent extension directed to an
active ingredient can exclude a drug product defined by not only (1)
the ingredients, use, and efficacy/effect included in the claim, but
also (2) quantity and dosage not included in the claim, but only
described in a subsequent disposition. 63 The IP High Court also
stated that the extended patent may exclude equivalents of the drug
product defined by these elements in the claim and subsequent
disposition. 64 This dictum led to considerable uncertainty in the
exclusive scope of patent extensions.65
Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 30, 2014,
Hei 25 (gyo ke) no. 10195, Hanrei Jiho No. 2232, 3,
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/hanrei/g_panel/index.html [Hereunder “IP
High Court Genentech decision].
62
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 17, 2015, Hei 26 (gyō hi) no. 356, 69 Saiko
saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1912, Hanrei Jiho No. 2309, 127.
63
Supra note 61, IP High Court Genentech decision.
64
Id.
65
Tokkyosken Sonzoku Kikan Enchō ni kansuru Chizai Daigougi Hanketsu
nituite [Regarding the IP High Court’s Grand Bench Decision on Patent
Term Extension], JAPAN GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
(May 29, 2015), http://www.jga.gr.jp/wp61
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This IP High Court interpretation of P.T.E. eligibility in
Genentech based on a subsequent market approval differs markedly
from the patent extension system in the United States.66 The U.S.
Patent Act 67 includes active ingredient limitations that prevent
innovative drug manufacturers from obtaining P.T.E.s on new
technologies associated with pre-approved drugs that include the
same active ingredients.68 When approval is granted to a combined
drug product, the product must include at least one ingredient that
was not previously approved for a P.T.E. grant. 69 The scope of
patent extensions for active ingredient claims is broader than a
Japanese patent extension; it not only includes the product specified
in the market approval, but also products with the same active
ingredients, and any salts or esters of the ingredients.70
The IP High Court’s eligibility interpretation is more consistent
with the European Union’s patent extension system, which relies on
a Supplemental Protection Certificate (S.P.C.) under the EU S.P.C.
Regulations.71 Similar to the J.P.L., the EU S.P.C. Regulations may
grant multiple S.P.C.s for drug products with the same active
ingredients. The EU S.P.C. Regulations prevent drug manufacturers
content/uploads/2015/05/efe7b8ac2da1edf77e9ca08f23f2a6d3.pdf. The IP
High Court’s grand bench tried to clarify the scope in Debiopharm Int’l v.
Touwa Yakuhin, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High
Ct.] Jan. 20, 2017, Heisei 28 (ne) no. 10046. The grand bench held that the
extended patent can exclude products which are substantially the same as
the drug products defined by the claim and subsequent deposition.
66
35 U.S.C. § 156.
67
Title 35 U.S.C.
68
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1).
69
Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on the Patent Term
Restoration Program, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 22,
2015),
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistan
ce/ucm069959.htm.
70
Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories. Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
71
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the
creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products,
1992 O.J. (L 182) 2; Regulation (EC) No. 1610/96 of the European
Parliament and of the Council concerning the creation of a supplementary
protection certificate for plant protection products, 1996 O.J. (L 198) 8
[hereinafter SPC Regulations]. For a comparative study on patent term
extension systems, see IIP, Best Practice, supra note 34, at 91.
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from obtaining S.P.C.s on drug products if (1) the authorization
granted to a drug product is not the first authorization72 or (2) an
S.P.C. has already been granted to the drug product.73 However, the
Court of Justice for the European Union (C.J.E.U.) has interpreted
the conditions to not preclude an S.P.C. grant for a new use of a drug
product, even if the drug product includes the same active ingredient
previously authorized for another use. 74 Although the C.J.E.U.
suggests that an S.P.C. may not be available if the patent under
examination based on a subsequent market approval includes a prior
patent for which an SPC was granted based on a prior market
approval; a prior market approval does not completely prevent
innovative drug manufacturers from obtaining another S.P.C. on the
same drug, regardless of the identity of the active ingredient.75
Although the C.J.E.U.’s eligibility interpretation differs from the
United States’ approach, the S.P.C. scope is similar to the United
States’ approach. An S.P.C. enjoys the same scope of exclusivity as
the scope of the original patent.76 If a patent that has been granted
an S.P.C. is directed to a product, the scope includes any drug
product with the same active ingredient, regardless of additional
active ingredients or uses of the product. 77 The scope of S.P.C.
exclusivity not only includes the active ingredient described in the
authorization, but also its derivatives, such as salts and esters, that
fall within the scope of the patent that was granted the S.P.C.78 This
scope is broader than the extended patent scope under the J.P.L.
because the extended patent scope only includes the drug product
described in a subsequent disposition. However, the IP High Court
has suggested that the scope may include equivalents of such
approved drug products.
72

SPC Regulations Art. 3(c).
SPC Regulations Art. 3(d).
74
Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v Comptroller-General of Patents, Case
C-130/11 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Jul. 19, 2012) .
75
Edward Oates, Neurim judgment of European Court of Justice liberalises SPC
system, AIPPI E-NEWS (Sept. 2012),
https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition26/Edward_Oates.html.
76
SPC Regulations, Art. 5.
77
Novartis AG v Actavis UK Ltd, Case C-442/11 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Feb. 9,
2012).
78
Farmitalia Carlo Erba Srl., Case C-392/97 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Sept. 16,
1999).
73
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C. New Use Patent Infringement Remedies
Despite the patent-friendly view of the P.T.E. system, new use
patents are difficult to enforce, even if a patent issues on a drug
product instead of a method under the J.P.L. Strong public policy
for keeping post-patent expiration products in the public domain
prevents courts from granting an injunction against such products.
Under the J.P.L., a product patent can exclude others from making,
using, assigning, exporting, importing, and offering to assign the
product. 79 An exception applies to product patents, the scope of
which is limited by a new use. This is because the new use
distinguishes the prior art product, which is structurally identical to
the claimed product. To maintain the prior art product in the public
domain, the creation, assignment, exportation, and importation of
the product should be free from patent protection, so long as the
product use is not the patented use. 80 In other words, a patentee
must establish that the product made or sold by an alleged infringer
will be used for the patented use.
Due to the burden necessary to establish use, a new use drug
product patent functions more like a method patent, which excludes
acts of using a method of treatment.81 Under current case law which
is supported by the majority of legal commentators, a patentee can
meet the burden when it shows that the product is sold with a
description, which indicates that the product is used for the patented

79

See JPL Art. 2(3)I; Art. 68. Scholars view the nature of new use drug product
inventions as method inventions. See Hiroshi Yoshida, Yōtohatsumei ni
kan’suru Tokkyoken no Sashitome Seikyū no Arikata – “Mono”ni
Chakumoshikushita Handan karra “Mono”ni Chakumokushita Handane
[Appropriate Injunction for Patent Infringement of New Use Invention:
From the Focus on “Product” to the Focus on “Person”], 16 Chiteki Zaisan
Seisaku Kenkyu 167, 173 (2007),
http://lex.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/coe/pressinfo/journal/vol_16/16_5.pdf
[hereinafter, “Yoshida, Appropriate Injunction”].
80
Shimako Kato, Yōto Hatsumei oyobi Yōto Genteiwo Fukumu Hatsumeino
Kenrikōshi nikan’suru Ichikōsatsu [A Study of Enforcement of Patents on
Use Inventions and Inventions Limited by Use], in CHITEKI
ZAISANHONO ATARASHII NAGARE [New Trends in Intellectual
Property] 189 (2010) [hereinafter “Kato, A Study of New Use Patent
Enforcement”].
81
Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law no.121 of 1959, art. 2(3)ii, art. 68.
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use.82 This description is included in a package insert attached to the
drugs or containers, as required under the P.M.D.. The package
insert must include dosage, administration, and other necessary
precautions and information necessary to the use and handling of the
drugs.83 The P.M.D.A. skinny label practice requires that the insert
be clear with respect to the exclusion of patented use or dosage.
However, prior to the adoption of this skinny label practice, when
the insert expressly or implicitly indicated a patented use or dosage,
the drug product infringed a new use patent. In the Ketotifen
Fumarate case, which was decided before the P.M.D.A. adopted its
skinny label practice, the Tokyo District Court found that the
patentee met the burden for showing that the drug will be used for
the patented use, even if the package insert did not expressly indicate
the patented use. 84 The court held that the patented use, the
prevention of allergic asthma, was implicitly indicated in the
package insert when the document included descriptions indicating
that (1) the drug is for treating bronchial asthma and (2) the drug is
not administered for trachea expansion during an asthma attack, but
is regularly administered daily.85
When a patented use is not included in a package insert, courts
may find an infringing use based on the totality of circumstances
surrounding the creation and sale of the drug product at issue.
In the Ketotifen Fumarate case, the Tokyo District Court
emphasized that infringement must be determined based on whether
an accused product falls within the patent scope by considering the
asserted claim, and the written description and drawings in light of
the general knowledge of one skilled in the art. Thus, although the
defendant secured market approval on the patented use under the
P.M.D., this fact did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
product was used for the patented use.86
In the Cilostazol case, the IP High Court found that a drug was
82

Kato, A Study of New Use Patent Enforcement, supra note 80, at 192.
Japanese scholars use “label theory” to find limit infringement of new use
patents to the circumstances where a package insert indicates a patented use.
83
See L.P.M.D. Art. 52-1. See supra note 5.
84
Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1992, Hei 2 (wa) 12094.
24 Chiteki zaisanken kankei minji, gyōsei saiban reishū. [Chiteki Saishū]
805, Hanrei Jiho No. 1469, 139.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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used for a patented use, even though the scope of the defendant’s
market approval did not include the patented use, because the
defendant emphasized that the patented use encourages doctors to
participate in clinical trials.87 Thus, it is likely that Japanese courts
are willing to find infringement under some circumstances to
support a drug being used for a patented use, even if a patented use
is clearly excluded from the disposition and a package insert clearly
excludes the patented use under the post-2009 skinny label practice.
Even with a finding of infringement, courts may be willing to
grant an injunction against drug sales, but are reluctant to grant an
injunction against manufacturing if a product has both infringing
and non-infringing uses. In the Ketotifen Fumarate case, the Tokyo
District Court granted an injunction against the defendant to stop the
sale of the drug product, despite its non-infringing use for treating
bronchial asthma.88 The prosecution record supported the notion
that the original claims included the non-infringing use, but were
limited through an amendment, which indicated that only the
allergic asthma prevention use was covered to overcome prior art.89
The court explained that the broad scope of the injunction was
necessary because it was impossible to distinguish infringing and
non-infringing uses of the drug product. However, the court did not
grant an injunction against the party making the Ketotifen Fumarate
compound because the compound alone has non-infringing uses
before it is processed as a drug product. Patent law scholars
criticized the broad scope of the injunction granted by the Tokyo
District Court. 90
87

Chiteki Zaisan Koto Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] Nov. 21, 2006,
Hei 17 (ne) 10125. This is not a patent infringement case but an employee
invention compensation case in which an employee sued his employer for a
reasonable compensation. Whether the employer worked a new use patent
invented by the employee was an issue in calculating reasonable
compensation for the employee because the JPL provides for mandatory
compensation to work an invention when the right of the invention is
transferred from an inventor to his employer. JPL Art. 35.
88
Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1992, Hei 2 (wa) 12094.
24 Chiteki zaisanken kankei minji, gyōsei saiban reishū. [Chiteki Saishū]
805, Hanrei Jiho No. 1469, 139.
89
Id.
90
Patent scholars criticize this broad injunction scope. E.g., Mimura Ryoichi,
Tokkyohan’I no Kaishaku to Keizaikatsudou no Jiyū [Construction of Patent
Claim and Freedom of Commercial Activities], Bessatsu NBL No. 120, 217
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Although using a drug product for a patented use constitutes
infringement, such use is exempted from infringement liability
when a patient takes the drug product for the patented use. This is
because the J.P.L. requires that a patented product is used for
business purposes to find infringement liability, which, then
excludes private uses.91 Courts do not typically find that doctors
and pharmacists are secondarily liable through the indirect
infringement theory because courts emphasize that strong policy
favors maintaining freedom in medical practice to provide patients
with the best treatments.92 In all aspects of their medical practice,
doctors should be exempted from patent infringement liability,
regardless of a patent. Pharmacists should also be protected from
liability as long as their activities constitute preparing a drug in
accordance with a prescription prepared by a medical doctor.93
Further, suing generic drug manufacturers for indirect
infringement is difficult because the J.P.L. does not afford an
infringement claim for acts equivalent to active inducement under
the U.S. Patent Act. 94 When an accused product has a noninfringing use, patentees must establish the following: (1) the
product is used for the patented product use; (2) the product is
indispensable for solving the problem of the patented method; (3)
the defendant knew of the asserted patent; and (4) the defendant
knew that the product would be used to infringe the patent.95 Courts
are divided as to the interpretation of the indispensable requirement;
certain courts require novelty to consider the product
indispensable.96 This view precludes indirect infringement liability
for a new use product patent because the drug product is a known
product, and thus, does not meet the indispensable requirement.
Other courts do not require novelty and find a product indispensable
if the product is necessary to solve a technical problem of the
(2007).
JPL Art. 68. See Toshiko Takenaka et al., Patent Enforcement in the US,
Germany and Japan 265 (2015).
92
Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] April 11, 2002, Hei 12 (gyo ke) 65,
Hanrei Jiho No. 1828, 99.
93
JPL Art. 69(3).
94
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
95
JPL Art. 101 iv.
96
E.g., Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 23, 2004, Hei 14 (wa)
6035 Hanrei Jihō No. 1982, 89.
91
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invention.97 Even with this perspective, establishing that a product
is indispensable remains difficult because the product may not solve
the technical problem independent of its use, which was illustrated
in case on a new treatment delivery.98
Generally, establishing infringement of a new use product patent
and obtaining an injunction against making, assigning, importing,
and exporting infringing products remains difficult. Thus, securing
incentives for market exclusivity through data protection remains
important. The current maximum six-year P.M.S. period for
previously approved drugs with a new use or dosage is essential for
securing such incentives for new use R&D. Under the P.M.D.A.
practice, generic drug manufactures cannot receive market approval
for a patented use until the patent expires. Because the patented use
is excluded from market approval, the burden should be shifted to
generic drug manufacturers to show that the description in the
package insert clearly excludes the patented use to avoid an
injunction against drug products. The Tokyo District Court’s
approach in the Ketotifen Fumarate case suggests this burden shift,
based on the notion that distinguishing infringing and non-infringing
uses is impossible.
Innovative drug manufactures can argue that patent incentives
for new use and treatment R&D are insufficient because of the
difficulties in obtaining injunctions. Certain Japanese scholars
propose that a right to compensation should be established for
medical treatment inventions and that a right to injunctive relief
should be eliminated. 99 This proposal might be difficult to
implement due to the difficulties in compensation calculation and
the high cost to administer compensation. Instead, an injunction
should be granted to prevent the production and sale of unpatented
drug products if: (1) a description clearly avoids a patented use or
(2) the totality of circumstances indicates that drugs are made solely
for a patented use, despite a description in the package insert.

E.g., Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.], September
30, 2005, Hei 17 (ne) 10040, Hanrei Jihō No. 1904, 47.
98
Kato, A Study of New Use Patent Enforcement, supra note 80, at 199. 99
Yoshida, Appropriate Injunction, supra note 79, at 231.
97
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CONCLUSION
Japan is one of most innovative drug manufacturer-friendly
countries because it revised its patent and drug regulation systems
for providing patent and non-patent incentives for new use and
treatment R&D based on its pro-patent and pro-medical science
policies. Fundamental patent policies for maintaining unpatented
products in the public domain and securing doctors’ freedom of
medical practice to provide the best medical treatments limit the
remedies available for infringement of new use product patents. To
enhance dispute resolution between innovative and generic drug
manufacturers without involving patients, doctors, and medical
practitioners, Japanese courts should use their discretion to flexibly
define the scope of an injunction. Such scope should reflect to a fine
balance on competing interests between securing incentives for new
use and treatment R&D and allowing freedom for generic drugs to
enter in the market.
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